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Abstract I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of
systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox
Bbottom-up^ aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox
aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three
cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a
singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the
way for different and potentially more plausible accounts of these three cases. I reflect
on how this mental files approach can be viewed either as a supplement to the orthodox
aetiology, or as suggesting an altogether different aetiology. I end by addressing a
concern surrounding the explanatory power of mental files.
1 Introduction
In this paper, I explore a mental files approach to delusional misidentification. More
specifically, I suggest that we can usefully think of delusional misidentification in terms
of systematic errors in the management of files. What causes or underpins this
mismanagement then becomes the central issue for debates concerning aetiologies of
delusional misidentification.
I proceed as follows. I begin by sketching the orthodox Bbottom-up^ aetiology of
delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a
descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist
interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is
based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and potentially more
plausible accounts of these three cases. I reflect on how this mental files approach can
be viewed either as a supplement to the orthodox aetiology, or as suggesting an
altogether different aetiology. I end by addressing a concern surrounding the explan-
atory power of mental files.
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2 The Orthodox Aetiology of the Capgras Delusion
The standard case of delusional misidentification (although we will encounter others) is
the Capgras delusion, the belief that a loved one has been replaced by an identical-
looking impostor.1 This is delusional (at least partly) because it is tenaciously held, in
spite of the fact that there seems to be no evidence to support it. What is striking is that
the subject’s perceptual system seems to be working fine: she’s not blind or agnosic in
any way. Furthermore, in cases that occur in the context of brain damage (and aren’t
accompanied by schizophrenia diagnoses), the subject displays a remarkable degree of
normality outside the delusion’s narrow domain. In this section, I sketch the orthodox
aetiology of this delusion, present some well-established variations of it, and then
introduce a novel variation, which consists in being a singularist or a descriptivist about
human cognition.
2.1 Bottom-Up vs. Top-Down Aetiologies
There are two very different approaches to understanding delusions in general, and the
Cagpras delusion in particular. The first approach, which has given rise to so-called
Bbottom-up^ models, views the delusion as grounded in some kind of anomalous
experience. The delusional subject experiences the world in a way that partly (and as
we shall see, perhaps entirely) explains why they believe what they do. Thus, in the
case of the Capgras delusion, something about the way the misidentified person is
experienced by the subject explains why the person is misidentified.
The other approach, which we will put to one side for most of the paper (it will
resurface at the very end), is the so-called Btop-down^ model, whereby the delusion is
not grounded in experience, but directly caused by brain dysfunction (Eilan 2000;
Campbell 2001). As John Campbell puts it, BBdelusion^ is a matter of top-down
disturbance in some fundamental beliefs of the subject which may consequently affect
experiences and actions^ (2001, p. 89). Thus any subjective report, for example, that
the Capgras patient’s mother feels unfamiliar, is a consequence of (or an accompani-
ment to) the delusional belief, but not grounds for it.
Top-down models are definitely a minority. 2 When I refer to the Borthodoxy
aetiology ,^ I am referring to the whole family of bottom-up models. Bottom-up models
come in a number of varieties. These varieties are the result of different views
concerning, first, the nature of the experience on which the belief is grounded, and,
second, the nature of the process of belief formation, maintenance or evaluation. Prior
to presenting these varieties, it is important to present the coarse-grained aetiology on
which the more precise varieties are built. I refer to this as the Bclassic^ bottom-up
account.
1 There is a debate concerning whether delusions are beliefs. This debate doesn’t concern us (at least not
directly), so, for ease, I will assume that delusions are beliefs.
2 Top-down views have found little support, perhaps, in part, because theorists feel it’s really not clear where
to start looking, as a cognitive and brain scientist, for direct neural causes of beliefs. It is much easier to
hypothesise about how certain kinds of brain damage might affect the subject’s experience, and then we might
get some idea, at the personal level, of how the experience gives rise to the belief.
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2.2 The Classic Bottom-Up Account
The classic bottom-up account, on which the current orthodoxy is built, is undoubtedly
Ellis and Young’s influential (1990) proposal that the Capgras delusion can be under-
stood as a sort of Binverse prosopagnosia^.
People with prosopagnosia have difficulty in the overt recognition of faces. If you
show them a picture of a familiar face, they will not be able to tell you whose face it is.
And yet, some of them appear to have differential autonomic responses (roughly,
affective/emotional responses) to these faces, as measured by heightened skin conduc-
tance response (SCR). In other words, although they themselves cannot tell you whose
face they are looking at, their affective system seems at the very least to be able to ‘tell’
that it is someone familiar. Borrowing Bauer’s (1984) model for facial processing,
whereby there are two streams for processing facial information – one covert, affective
and anatomically dorsal, the other overt, semantic and anatomically ventral – Ellis and
Young hypothesized that, whereas with prosopagnosia the affective stream for Bcovert
recognition^ is intact and the semantic stream for Bovert recognition^ is impaired, with
the Capgras delusion it is the other way around.
This means that the Capgras patient is presented with someone who, thanks to intact
semantic processing, looks to them exactly like a loved one, but there is a lack of
affective response. The perceived person feels unfamiliar and the patient therefore
concludes that this person cannot be the loved one in question.3
2.3 Explanationist vs. Endorsement Accounts
There is a debate within bottom-up theories about what precisely the nature of the
anomalous experience, which is driving the delusional judgement, really is. To borrow
Bayne and Pacherie’s (2004) terminology, Bexplanationist^ accounts (e.g., Ellis and
Young 1990; Maher 1974) claim that the content of the Capgras patient’s experience is
something sparse like, BThis man feels unfamiliar^, and that the delusional judgment
explains the bizarre experience. The delusional inference takes something like the follow-
ing abductive form (Ellis and Young, themselves, call this a ‘rationalization strategy’):
1. This man looks like my father.
2. This man feels unfamiliar (hence doesn’t feel like my father).
[How do I explain that, although this man looks like my father (and hence
should feel like my father), he fails to feel like my father?]
3. He must not be my father.4
3 This model was given experimental support (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997, Ellis et al. 1997) when it was
discovered that, in contra-distinction to prosopagnosia, Capgras patients show diminished SCR when pre-
sented with familiar faces. Of course, as top-down theorists are quick to emphasise, this data is compatible
with the hypothesis that reduced autonomic response is a consequence, rather than a cause, of the misiden-
tification. In other words, the individual feels unfamiliar because she has been judged to not be the subject’s
mother, rather than the other way around.
4 The Ellis and Young aetiology looks like an explanationist model. However, it is not obvious that lack of
affective response is something on the basis of which the person performs an inference, or if it is something
subpersonal which presents the subject with the experiential content: BThis is not my father .^
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The opposing accounts, so-called Bendorsement^ accounts (e.g., Bayne and
Pacherie 2004) claim that the delusional content is encoded directly in the
unusual experience, and all that suffices is endorsement of that content. The content
of the Capgras patient’s experience, on such a view, is something rich like, BThis man is
not my father .^
Regardless of the plausibility of either account, it is worth noting an
explanatory trade-off. As Pacherie (2009) points out, the explanationist account
can more easily explain how the experience gets its content, since the content
is so sparse. It can simply claim that there is a disruption in emotional or
affective processing. However, it is a bigger explanatory step from the sparse
content of the experience to the rich content of the delusion. One prima facie
problem with this is that, if the experience is sparse and non-specific, why is
there not a wider array of potential hypotheses used to explain it? (BMaybe I
don’t like mum anymore^, BMaybe I’m tired^ etc.). In contrast, the endorsement
theorist can get from the experience to the judgement just fine, since they have
the same content. However, as Pacherie puts it, where Bthe endorsement account
would appear to be weakest is in explaining how delusional patients could have
the experiences that the account says they do^ (Pacherie 2009, p.107). We will
return to this issue later.
2.4 One-Factor vs. Two-Factor Accounts
The delusion is not just formed briefly but maintained over time and in the face
of much contrary evidence, namely, the testimony of others (including people
of authority such as doctors) and, of course, the obvious implausibility of the
delusional scenario.5 Is the affectively anomalous experience enough to account
for the delusion? Some (e.g., Maher 1974; Reimer 2009) say that it is. These
are called one-factor accounts. Others claim that there needs to be something
else to explain the tenacity of the delusion. In addition to the unusual experi-
ence, there must be a reasoning bias or deficit (Stone and Young 1997; Davies
et al. 2001; Coltheart 2005; Coltheart et al. 2010). These are called two-factor
accounts.
Two-factor accounts are probably the more popular of the two (they are widely
accepted by other theorists, who are not key proponents of the view, e.g., Bayne and
Pacherie 2004; Bortolotti 2009). However, there is something unsatisfactory about both
sides of the debate. While one-factor accounts struggle to explain why the delusion is
so tenacious, two-factor accounts struggle to give tangible accounts of the second
factor. One problem for two-factor theories is that if the second factor is a reasoning
bias, then one would expect it to be domain general. This seems to be in conflict with
the fact that several delusional patients are strikingly normal beyond the delusion’s
narrow domain.
5 The patients are sometimes sensitive to this implausibility. Patient DS (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997,
p.438) when asked why this man was pretending to be his father, he replied BThat is what is so surprising,
doctor; why should anyone want to pretend to be my father? Maybe my father employed him to take care of
me … paid him some money so that he could pay my bills.^
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Insofar as both one-factor and two-factor accounts are bottom-up accounts, they are
sub-varieties of the orthodox aetiology.6
2.5 Descriptivist and Singularist Versions of the Orthodox Aetiology
Now I’d like to draw attention to two other varieties, within the orthodox
aetiology, that have thus far gone unnoticed. These varieties stem from two
opposing and fundamental positions about how human cognition links up with
the world, namely, whether human cognition is property-based or individual-
based. 7 We can think of individual-based and property-based cognition in
engineering terms. You could build a robot whose basic cognitive relation to
the world is one of qualitative Brecognition^. It would go around detecting
colours, shapes or patterns, namely, properties that can be multiply instantiated.
Then you might want to give it a capacity for building Bconceptions^ of
individuals purely out of the properties it can detect. Alternatively, you could
build a robot whose basic cognitive relation to the world is one of Btracking^,
namely, of keeping track of individual things, independently of, and prior to,
the attribution of any property. Saying that human cognition is individual-based
is making the empirical claim that human beings are, in an important sense,
more like the latter than the former kind of robot. They have a pre-predicative
tracking mechanism.
There is an analogy that can be drawn between property-based and individual-based
cognitive systems, and a distinction among (mental and linguistic) theories of
reference between descriptivism and singularism. Descriptivism, as Recanati
(2012) puts it, is the view that BObjects are given to us only qua instantiators
of whatever properties we take them to have^ (p.3). According to singularism,
on the other hand: BObjects are given to us directly, in experience, and we do
not necessarily think of them as the bearers of such and such properties (even
though the properties of objects are revealed to us when we encounter them in
experience)^ (p.4). Although the analogy is not perfect, I will, for ease, use
Bdescriptivism^ to refer to the position that maintains that human cognition is proper-
ty-based, and Bsingularism^ for its individual-based counterpart.
Now, what has this got to do with the orthodox aetiology of delusional misidenti-
fication? The key lies in the role that singularists and descriptivists can allow the
diminished affect to play in identification (and hence misidentification). For the
descriptivist, the familiarity of the perceived individual is a property that, in principle,
other individuals could also have. A descriptivist version of the orthodox aetiology
would look like this. Recall that, according to descriptivism, Bobjects are given to us
only qua instantiators of whatever properties we take them to have^ (Recanati 2012,
p.3). The subject, in the Capgras case, takes person S to have (among other properties),
A (e.g., what the person looks like) and B (e.g., what the person feels like). This person
6 There is a sense in which a top-down account can be seen as having only one factor (e.g., one deficit).
However, given that the one factor vs. two factor debate centres around whether the anomalous experience
alone suffices to explain the delusion, top-down account clearly cannot take part in the debate.
7 By Bindividual^, I mean in the broad sense of being a unique particular. I mean it to include objects of any
kind: animals, persons, chairs, billiard balls.
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has A, but not B, and therefore cannot be S.8 In other words, there are two properties
that compete in a rational, evidential calculus.
A singularist version of the orthodox aetiology could look very different. A
singularist certainly wouldn’t want to deny that we often judge the identity of some-
thing on the basis of its properties. However, that is not what the judgement of identity
consists in. This frees up the possibility that there can be other paths to identification. In
particular, such a view could allow that Bx looks like S^ is a judgement about
something having a property, whereas Bx is S^ is a judgement based on a Bdirect
relation^ between the subject and the encountered individual, who is Bnot necessarily
[thought of] as the bearer of such and such properties^. One upshot of this is that Bx
looks like S^ and Bx is S^ (or, more relevantly, Bx isn’t S^) won’t compete in a rational,
evidential calculus. We will see more on this, and its implications for understanding
delusional misidentification.
2.6 Three Cases
The descriptivist version of the orthodox aetiology of delusional misidentification
works very well, in principle, for the Bstandard^ cases of the Capgras delusion, which
involve a stable (rather than reduplicative) misidentification of a small set of loved
ones. It enables us to understand the subject’s judgement, enables us to put ourselves in
the subject’s shoes, so to speak (we can ask ourselves BWhat would it be like if I saw
my parents but they felt unfamiliar?^). Furthermore it explains why, in the standard
cases, the delusion only concerns loved ones. The subject only misidentifies loved ones
because it’s only with loved ones that a feeling of warmth or familiarity is expected
(namely, it is only loved ones who are taken to have the property of being able to arouse
in the subject the relevant sense of familiarity). However, it encounters some, perhaps
not insurmountable, obstacles when explaining other cases that one would hope to
explain in the same way. I run through them now, and rehearse the responses that are
available to the descriptivist. Responses are available, but they are not as neat as those
available to the singularist. Indeed some of the responses might even be gesturing in a
singularist direction.
2.6.1 Case 1: Global Capgras
Many Capgras patients misidentify far more than their loved ones. Ellis et al. (1997)
mention a patient who was under the impression that almost everybody in a town had
8 A view that doesn’t build on Ellis and Young’s (1990) hypothesis, but which is still implicitly committed to
descriptivism is the view of Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) and Hirstein (2010). They emphasize the
difference between the perceivable properties of an individual, and our representations of them Bfrom the inside^.
According to them, the Capgras delusion occurs when our Binternal^ representation of the person is damaged or
inaccessible. This produces the impression of someone who looks right on the outside, but seems different on the
inside (that is why Hirstein 2010 claims that these misidentification syndromes are mindreading disorders). It is
illustrative to see how this is descriptivist. On their view, we represent two different kinds of properties of a person:
their appearance, and what they are like Bas a person.^ In contrast, I want to emphasize the central singularist
insight that there is a deep distinction between recognizing properties and tracking individuals. The latter is
independent of any property, even the Binternal^ ones. I can, in principle, see someone as a certain individual, even
though both her appearance and her personality have changed beyond all recognition. Hirstein’s view also
struggles to account for the delusional misidentification of inanimate objects (e.g., Alexander et al. 1979).
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been replaced. The expectation of a feeling of familiarity might not plausibly account
for these cases since you don’t expect to feel familiarity when you meet a mere
acquaintance.
In response, what could be claimed is that some affective response is implicated in
identifying everyone that one has previously encountered, even those one doesn’t know
very well. Perhaps the worse the affective damage, the larger the set of misidentified
people. Perhaps one might even hypothesise that the incremental damage to affective
processing would correlate with incremental misidentification, starting with the most
familiar, and working towards the least familiar.
2.6.2 Case 2: Reduplicative Capgras
The descriptivist struggles to explain the cases where the duplicates themselves are
duplicated (i.e., the impostors are replaced, as in the original case described by Capgras
and Reboul-Lachaux (1923), where Mme M. reduplicated her husband an estimated 80
times). This cannot be the result of expected emotional response, since the subjects
would not expect a feeling of familiarity from the impostor. Indeed, on this view, it is
this lack of feeling of familiarity that makes them judge it to be an impostor in the first
place.
In response, what could be claimed is that a feeling of familiarity can (and does (cf.
e.g., Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997)) grow for Bthe impostor^ and becomes consti-
tutive of the subject’s conception of them. But then, if this feeling were to suddenly
wane, then the now-familiar impostor might themselves be judged to be an impostor.
2.6.3 Case 3: The Frégoli Delusion
A patient with the Frégoli delusion will claim that a known individual has taken on the
appearance of a nearby stranger. In other words, it involves claiming that someone is S
in spite of looking nothing like S.9 The descriptivist aetiology, since it explains the lack
of identification in terms of diminished affective response, would presumably explain
the Frégoli delusion in terms of heightened affective response (as suggested by Davies
et al. 2001). This works for the Capgras delusion because the relevant candidate
identity is suggested to the subject by the encountered individual’s appearance, and
that is defeated by a lack of warmth (or sense of familiarity). In order for it to work with
the Frégoli delusion, one needs to make the claim that affect alone can pick out a
specific identity. But this is perhaps implausible. One might expect a heightened sense
of warmth or familiarity to elicit a vague BHaven’t I met you before?^ sort of response.
In response, one can take an explanationist or an endorsement angle. One can
(adopting an explanationist strategy) claim that the experience of heightened familiarity
is indeed vague, but a more precise hypothesis is adopted in order to explain it. Of
course, then we need an account of why that hypothesis is adopted and not another.
9 Feinberg et al. (1999), for example, report a brain-damaged patient, BJ, who:
…approached a severely disabled, wheelchair-bound patient in his early twenties whom he had never
met before, and claimed that the patient was his younger son. […] He maintained this misidentification despite
clear differences in physical appearance between the falsely identified patient and his son. Even when these
distinctions were pointed out by staff, BJ maintained his original assertion that the patient was his son. (1999,
p.378)
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Alternatively, (adopting an endorsement strategy) one can view the experience as
precise. One might say that, although we might not be consciously aware of this, we
do have fine-grained affective profiles for specific individuals. This is perhaps not too
implausible. However, as we will see, it is going somewhat in the direction of
singularism.
3 A Mental Files Approach
In this section I present a singularist version of the orthodox aetiology and, in particular,
one that uses the notion of mental files. The approach suggests that we think of
delusional misidentification in terms of a mismanagement of mental files. Afterwards,
however, we will consider whether a mental files approach might be viewed as going
beyond the orthodox bottom-up aetiology altogether.
3.1 Identification and Predication
Assuming individual-based cognition, what happens when you judge that someone you
perceive is a certain individual is something that is importantly, both logically and
psychologically, very different from what happens when you judge that someone has a
certain property or appearance (e.g., red hair). In the latter case, you are predicating a
property of an individual. It is a judgement of the form Fa. You might have quite a rich
conception of that individual, know them rather well, or you might only know the bare
minimum to achieve some kind of demonstrative mental reference (BThis stranger,
walking past me now, has red hair^). In contrast, identifying (or re-identifying)
someone involves the judgement that an individual currently perceived (or otherwise
relevant) is the very same individual as another individual, one you have previously
encountered or been somehow familiarised with (e.g., someone you have read about or
seen on TV), in principle independently of any properties they may have. It is of the
form a=b, not Fa.
Although grammatically speaking, ‘=’ can be treated as a two-place predicate,
psychologically speaking, if cognition is individual-based, the mental act of identifying
is not the mental act of predicating. When you judge that this individual (person, dog,
set of keys) is the same as one encountered in the past, this does not consist in the
attribution of any specific property (although it may, of course, entail that some very
general properties have to be attributed, e.g., the property of being a ‘thing’). At a very
minimum, the individual identified has to have some kind of informational salience as
an individual (as opposed to as a bearer of certain properties).10 You cannot identify an
individual that you have not encountered in any way before.11 Suppose we are walking
down the street and I point to a complete stranger and I ask you: BWho is that?^ I am
10 This kind of ‘significance as an individual’ happens less often with inanimate objects, because we only
rarely care about the particularity of inanimate objects, we care about their properties (if you break something
of mine, unless it has sentimental value, I don’t care if you replace it with an identical duplicate).
11 I mean this in the broad sense of ‘encounter’, to include any kind of informational channel (e.g., including
the media). You can clearly meet someone for the first time and say, BIt’s great to finally meet you: I’ve heard
so much about you^. That counts as identification, but then the Bhearing so much about them^ counts as
Bencountering^.
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asking you to identify that individual, but this is an impossible task. I am asking you to
draw a connection of identity between the encountered individual and a previously
encountered individual, but where there is no previous encounter.
The fact that identification does not consist in attributing a property is in line with a
rather basic truism: a at t1 and b at t2 can be the same individual in spite of having
different properties (i.e., persistence through change), and a and b can be distinct
individuals in spite of having the same properties. This truism has certain epistemic
consequences: you can be correct in judging that a at t1 and b at t2 are the same
individual in spite of having very different properties, and that a and b are distinct
individuals in spite of having the same properties.12
As we will see, mental files can be a useful way of thinking about this difference
between identification and predication. While identification involves merging (or
linking) two files, predication involves putting information into a file.
3.2 Introducing Mental Files
Talk of mental files provides us with a helpful way of thinking about singularist
psychosemantics. Mental files are opened upon an encounter with an individual and
then filled with information that is taken to pertain to the individual.13 Then when that
individual is re-encountered, that file is retrieved, and more information can be put in
the file. The content of a file for an individual constitutes the subject’s conception of
that individual. This conception will involve a variety of different kinds of information
that is taken to pertain to that individual; what they have done, when the subject has
encountered them in the past, character traits etc., as well as what they look like. This
conception can be false in many ways, and yet still be about that individual, since it is
the initial encounter that caused the opening of the file that determines the individual
that the file is about. Thus, mental files are Bnon-descriptive modes of presentation^, or
to put it in terms that evoke less of a Neo-Fregean framework, they are non-descriptive
singular mental representations. Their correctness conditions do not evoke properties,
but specific individuals. Thus, correct retrieval of a mental file occurs when it is
retrieved for the very same individual that the file was created for, regardless of how
much their detectable properties may have changed. Retrieval of a file is incorrect if it is
retrieved for an individual for whom it was not created, (regardless of how much that
individual shares detectable properties with the initial individual). Alternatively, an
error occurs if a new file is created when an old file should have been retrieved. This is
the mistake that is relevant for the Capgras delusion.
One important use for mental files is in modelling discoveries about numerical
identity or distinctness. The idea is that when you discover that individuals encountered
on two different occasions (or in different ways) are in fact one and the same individual,
12 Note how the former is the kind of judgement that someone with the Frégoli delusion (the delusion that
people from one’s past are taking on the appearance of surrounding strangers) makes, and that the latter is the
kind of judgement that someone with the Capgras delusion makes; both, of course, are erroneous.
13 Mental files are used in a number of subtly different ways by different theorists. What I am calling Bmental
files^, some mental file theorists will call Bsingular files^ since they want to allow that there are mental files
that aren’t singular (e.g., files for natural kinds). However, I haven’t yet been convinced by the need to use
mental files for anything other than singular cognition, so I am happy to use either term.
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you merge two files into one.14 Conversely, if you thought that two individuals were
identical, but then realised that they are in fact distinct, then your file divides into two
files. To illustrate both merging and division in one unlikely example, suppose you start
working in a new research centre. After a few weeks of walking past new colleagues in
the corridor and politely saying BHello^, but prior to the official meet-and-greet, you are
under the impression that, among your new colleagues, there is one bearded man and
two women with glasses. However, at the meet-and-greet, you realise that there are in
fact two bearded men in your centre, and you had in fact encountered both, but hadn’t
realised that they were distinct individuals. Here your file for Bthe bearded guy at the
office^ splits into two. Strikingly, you furthermore realise that there is in fact only one
woman with glasses, you just thought that there were two (because she sometimes
wears her hair up). There your two files merge into one.
Now, there are (at least) two importantly different kinds of files: BDemonstrative^
and BStable^ files. When you encounter an individual for the first time, you open a file.
This file is dependent on the current perceptual context. It is a file for, e.g., Bthis man
I’m perceiving now .^ This is a perceptual-demonstrative file. However, when the man
in question is no longer perceived, you may still be able to think of him in virtue of
episodic memory, for example, by recollecting the context of the encounter. This
becomes a memory-demonstrative file. It is a file for Bthe man I was perceiving then^.
However, when you know enough about a person, and have a stable enough conception
of them (and in particular, attaching a proper name to them can be a useful and
cognitively low-cost way of doing this (see Jeshion 2009)), you have a Bstable^ file
for that person. You can think about them in any context: you neither have to perceive
them, nor do you have to remember any specific encounter. But what happens when
you perceptually encounter someone that you have a stable file for? What happens is
that you open a perceptual-demonstrative file, retrieve your stable file, and merge (or
link) the two. This amounts to judging Bthis man here present, is the very same as this
man of whom I have stable conception^. If the individual for whom you opened the
perceptual-demonstrative file is not the individual for whom you initially opened the
stable file, then this is one kind of misidentification. This is mistaking somebody for
somebody else. Another kind of misidentification is failing retrieve any stable file,
when doing so would have been appropriate. This would involve treating somebody as
a stranger when they are in fact not a stranger.
3.3 (Mis)identification as (Mis)management of Files
In a paper that puts forward a ‘theory of integrated tracking’ Bullot (2009) presents the
example of Mary and her spouse George. Mary successfully tracks George, ‘first as
briefly located in her left visual field at t1, then as a voice saying Bgoodbye^ at t2, and
eventually as somebody who has arrived back after a day at work and can be perceived
14 Some theorists (e.g., Lawlor 2001; Recanati 2012) prefer to think of this in terms of Blinking^ two files
rather than Bmerging^ two into one. Hence they would deny that there are as many files as salient individuals
in the subject’s world. Perhaps they would say there are as many files as there are singular modes of
presentation, and that subjects can maintain more than one mode of presentation for (someone they know
to be) one individual. One motivation behind this may be that it makes it easier to correct a mistaken
identification.
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in a multimodal experience at t3’ (Bullot 2009, p.357).15 We can think of this in terms
of mental files. At t1, t2 and t3, Mary opens a perceptual demonstrative file and merges
it with her successfully retrieved George file, thereby correctly identifying him through-
out. Let’s suppose, instead, that Mary is brain-damaged between t2 and t3, and asserts,
to George’s horror, on his return: BYou’re not George!^ What is happening here is that
at t3, Mary has failed to retrieve her George file, and instead has opened a new
demonstrative file, for BThis man here present^, which does not merge with the George
file.
There is an important question about what has caused the failure to retrieve the file.
And clearly, it differs from a misidentification on the basis of, e.g., prosopagnosia, or
amnesia. Mary, if she is like the Capgras patients described in the clinical literature
(e.g., Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997, Lucchelli and Spinnler 2007), can process the
appearance of faces (not prosopagnosic) and remembers all of the relevant encounters
(not amnesic). One might even hypothesise that all the information is there, it is just
being mismanaged.
Now, it may well be that file-retrieval is triggered by something in affective
processing. Alternatively, it could be (in the spirit of a top-down aetiology) that an
affective response is a result, and not a cause, of file retrieval and that this has been
directly damaged by the lesion. These are hypotheses that might be testable somewhere
down the line, and I have no intention of adjudicating between them here. The
important point for our purposes is that the misidentification need not be based on an
inference on the basis of properties that the perceived individual is taken to have or not
have (including the property of Bfeeling a certain way^ to the subject).
3.4 Fleshing out the Endorsement Account
Recall the explanatory trade-off between the explanationist and the endorsement
accounts. The challenge for the endorsement account is to explain how it is that the
experience can have the rich misidentificational content that the account claims it has.
One can view the contribution of the mental files approach as a way of addressing this.
Two things should be said at this point.
First, this would suggest that identity can enter into perceptual content. In other
words, you can perceive (or fail to perceive) a person’s identity directly, without
inferring it. It would be interesting to see how this idea relates to recent debates about
the kinds of properties that enter into the content of perceptual experiences. For
example, Susanna Siegel (2006) has recently argued that kind-properties can enter into
perceptual content. Is the claim that identity enters into perceptual content a stronger or
a weaker claim than this? Answering this will in turn depend on whether one is a
singularist or a descriptivist. If one is a singularist in general, and a files theorist in
particular, then it is arguably a weaker claim. There’s nothing mysteriously rich about
15 Bullot explicitly contrast this with the Capgras patient who, ‘may fail to perform the integrative tracking of
their spouse due to a delusional belief that the person perceived at t1 has been replaced by an impostor at t3’
(ibid). Although this is broadly correct, it is phrased in a misleading way. It suggests that the tracking has failed
as a result of the subject’s delusional belief. However, on the view I am proposing here, this is the wrong way
around: the subject’s delusional belief is the result of a failed tracking mechanism. This is not pedantic: it is
crucial to what is distinctive about a singularist, tracking-based, view that is grounded in an intuitive
perceptual tracking mechanism.
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the content of the Capgras experience according to the endorsement model. That is
because taking someone to be a certain individual is something primitive in human
cognition; it is not, as the descriptivist would have it, something that is built up out of
more fundamental properties.
The second point is to do with how this relates to the one-factor vs. two-factor
debate. It seems that, even if the content of the delusion is already in the perceptual
experience, this still doesn’t explain why the delusion is so tenacious. After all, we
often override what our perceptual states tell us. For example, with the Muller-Lyer
illusion, we don’t go on believing that the lines are different lengths just because they
still appear to be so. Thus it seems that endorsement models, as fleshed out by mental
files, would need a second factor as much (or perhaps almost as much) as the
explanationist model. This is something that endorsement theorist seem happy to
embrace (Bayne and Pacherie 2004).
4 Accounting for the Cases
Here I will present the kinds of accounts of the cases that are available to a singularist,
files-based, version of the orthodox aetiology. Such an aetiology can be thought of as
an endorsement account that has been fleshed out with mental files.
4.1 Case 1: Global Capgras
Recall that the descriptivist needs to explain Global Capgras in terms of how mere
acquaintances, and not just loved ones, would be expected to arouse at least some sense
of familiarity in the subject. In contrast, the mental files approach wouldn’t rely on such
affective expectations on the part of the subject. Global Capgras would be explained in
terms of a global failure to retrieve files, and therefore of erroneously opening new
demonstrative files for people who have in fact already been encountered. Even though
the subject remembers all the previous encounters with those people, he doesn’t
remember them as encounters with those very individuals, but rather with different,
yet identical-looking, individuals.
Much more work would be needed, but the singularist could then hope to flesh out
the empirical details of her account, perhaps by hypothesising that the file retrieval is
caused, or constituted, by some kind of Baffective processing^.16 Note, as we
said before, that the singularist would not take the damage to affective pro-
cessing to give rise to an experience like BThis person doesn’t feel like S^, which would
evidentially compete with the encountered person’s overt appearance. Rather,
what it is to directly judge that someone is or is not a certain known individual
is (at least partly) caused or underpinned (where Bcaused^ would imply asyn-
chrony, and Bunderpinned^ simultaneity) by something that gets experimentally
detected as Baffective processing^.
16 A problem that all aetiologies share is that the term Baffective processing^ is so vague. For example,
sometimes it seems to refer to a conscious emotional process, sometimes to a physiological response or low-
level neural activation.
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4.2 Case 2: Reduplicative Capgras
The descriptivist has to explain why the impostor himself would be replaced by another
double in terms to Bthe impostor^ becoming familiar, and then the relevant affect in turn
being disrupted or diminished. In contrast, the mental files approach would view this as
an excessive opening of new files, and failure to retrieve old ones. Pushed to extremes,
a total mismanagement would mean that every encounter with an individual would be
as if that individual was being encountered for the first time; every discrete encounter
would result in further reduplication. Again, more work would need to be done, but the
singularist could view the mismanagement as being caused by disruption to low-level
cues that enable file-retrieval. Perhaps these could count as Baffective^ or as involving
Baffective processing^.
4.3 Case 3: The Frégoli delusion
As we said, in order for the descriptivist to account for the Frégoli delusion, she needs
to make the claim that a feeling of familiarity can pick out a specific individual. In
contrast, given the mental files approach, one would expect a specific individual to be
selected, since it would involve hyper-active file retrieval (which may be caused,
accompanied, or underpinned by something affective). It would involve retrieving a
file when it is inappropriate to do so; the excessive drawing of connections of identity
between currently perceived individuals and individuals encountered in the subject’s
past. There would be nothing vague, or gut-feeling-like, about it. This seems to be
reflected in the assured assertions of Frégoli patients. These assertions do not seem to
be inferentially arrived at on the basis of a vague feeling: the person’s identity is
asserted with certainty.
5 An Alternative Contribution of Mental Files?
We have seen that a potential contribution of mental files is within an orthodox,
bottom-up aetiology. In particular, it can be viewed as providing theoretical support
and motivation for the idea, central to an endorsement model, that experience can be of
specific individuals. However, one could alternatively view mental files as suggesting
something rather different, something more akin to a top-down model (and which, like
all top-down accounts, bypasses the fraught one-factor vs. two-factor debate). As we
have seen, endorsement accounts can be both singularist, and committed to an ortho-
dox, bottom-up, aetiology. Is it possible, let alone plausible, to keep a commitment to
the former, while discarding the latter? Perhaps it is.
Endorsement accounts show an implicit adherence to what we might call a Btesti-
monial view of perceptual experience^. This view takes perceptual experience to be
(always) epistemically analogous to somebody telling you something, in the sense that
you can weigh up whether or not you should trust it. Such Bweighing up^ might, for
example, be done on the grounds of belief about the reliability of the source. If you
know you have just taken a strong hallucinogen (or been informed that you have brain
damage), you might have reason to distrust your senses, much like how you might
distrust an informant you knew to be untrustworthy. Alternatively, you can distrust your
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senses because they are presenting you with something which doesn’t square with lots
of other information, much like you can distrust an informant who, for all you know, is
generally reliable, but who tells you something deeply implausible. Of course, the
Capgras patient has both of these reasons to distrust what her perceptual experience is
telling her. Explaining why the patient goes against these reasons is what the two-factor
theory is trying to achieve.
However, suppose that perceptual experience isn’t always something that presents
you with a content that you can weigh up for plausibility, and always in principle reject.
Suppose that sometimes it forces you to judge something. Suppose that this is what
happens in the Capgras case. Whatever mechanism is responsible for the mismanage-
ment of files doesn’t just present you with a content that you can consider: it gives rise
to an experience that carries inbuilt doxastic weight. We earlier compared the Capgras
experience with the Muller-Lyer illusion as a way of showing that the endorsement
account also needs a second factor. Humans, we claimed, can, as in the Muller-Lyer
illusion, form beliefs that go against what their perceptual experience is telling them.
However, perhaps this comparison is a poor one. Perhaps the obvious differences
between the Muller-Lyer Illusion and the Capgras experience provide important clues.
The Muller-Lyer Illusion, and other illusions, concern judgements of appearance, not
judgements of identity. Properties such as length, for example, are multiply instantiable.
For a singularist, a judgement about the length of a line is predicative in a way that a
judgement about identity isn’t. Your perceptual experience can encourage you to
predicate one thing, but you can override it with competing indirect evidence (such
as measuring the lines with a ruler). But in cases where the judgement is not predica-
tive, but one of identity being drawn between two individuals, this might not be the
right kind of thing that competing perceptual evidence can directly encourage or
discourage. Compare two attempts at getting someone to revise their beliefs. In one
case, the belief is predicative, in the other it is not.
A1 – BThose lines are different lengths because they look different lengths.^
A2 – BI assure you they are the same length: go and measure them!^
B1 – BThat’s not my father^ (where Bmy father^ is a directly referring singular term).
B2 – BOf course it is your father. It looks exactly like him!^
The problem with B2, according to the mental files theorist, is that it wrongly
assumes that the judgement of identity (or lack thereof) is grounded in properties. But
perhaps B1 is not grounded in properties. If this is the case, then B2 is bound to be wide
of the mark, and unconvincing to the delusional subject. The predicative judgement
BThis person looks like my father^ is one that the delusional subject has already made;
B2 is simply restating it, and, in any case, it simply doesn’t evidentially compete with
B1, which has been caused by an inability to retrieve the correct file.
To sum up, then, perhaps these tracking deficits can, because tracking is so prim-
itive, produce experiences that are somehow indubitable. Or, to put it more clearly,
perhaps these deficits produce judgements that are somehow immune to revision in the
light of other evidence that is overtly present in the experience (e.g., what the individual
looks like). Indeed, one might even think that, for explaining the delusional state, one
shouldn’t talk in terms of inferences on the basis of experiential evidence, but rather
explain it at the neural level. Perhaps by the time that we get to conscious experience
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the misidentification is already there. And here we seem to be considering something
rather similar to the top-down theories we put aside at the start. Then, of course, if this
is the case, then the entire one-factor/two-factor debate is misguided.
I do not want to support either the bottom-up, fleshed-out endorsement account, or
the top-down account. I do think, however, that it is important to consider the latter as
an option.
6 A Concern: Explanation or Re-description?
To finish, I’d like to address a very general concern that someone might have about the
mental files approach. Is this talk of files anything more than just a fancy re-descrip-
tion? My answer to this is that, in an important sense, it is a re-description. However, it
is a re-description that carries tremendous explanatory potential. It provides us with an
easy and intuitive way of talking and thinking about the dynamics of singular cogni-
tion. In particular, it does so with the crucial distinction between a file and its content.
This is metaphorical insofar as there are not literally files, and they do not literally
contain things. However, there are so many phenomena that can be thought of in
precisely this way, namely, in terms of merging, splitting, opening and adding to files.
For our purposes, the functional distinction between a file and its content nicely
captures the fact that we can take an individual to be a certain individual, independently
of the properties that we took them to have. This rather profound yet simple point,
which is at the heart of singularist psychosemantics, is crucial in helping us understand
delusional misidentification. The notion that someone could judge that someone is not
S in spite of looking just like what the subject took S to look like (Capgras) or that
someone could judge that someone is S in spite of looking nothing like them (Fregoli)
is much less outlandish to the singularist than to the descriptivist.17
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